

18 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Notes on Meeting with Dr. McMillan
on Friday, 17 May 1963

1. Additional U-2's for IDEALIST. I again raised the question as to getting official sign-off on the additional U-2's for the IDEALIST program. McMillan indicated that although Gilpatric had given tentative approval, Gilpatric had indicated that he would like to order this transfer to keep McMillan out of the argument with SAC. McMillan had still not taken any steps to get such action out of Gilpatric. During the discussion it became apparent that McMillan was backing off the decision to authorize the increase in the U-2 force. He again requested justification for the increase in terms of flight hours, both operational and training, per aircraft presently in use on the IDEALIST program. I reviewed our requirements by location and pointed out that we had been operating on a shoestring for the past year and unable to make commitments in a satisfactory manner as a consequence. He concurred in all of these requirements but still would like information on U-2 usage. (OSA - please provide data).

2. TAGBOARD Responsibility. We again discussed the question of responsibility for the development of TAGBOARD. McMillan indicated that there was a strong military requirement for TAGBOARD which could justify military development including the possible use of TAGBOARD for bomb delivery. I pointed out that this had never been under consideration in justifying the original TAGBOARD program and doubted very much whether this was at all a useful system for this purpose. I further pointed out that the justification for TAGBOARD was clearly as an alternative for the A-12 for reconnaissance of denied areas which under present policy which neither McMillan nor I were prepared to change was a CIA responsibility. I felt that splitting the development phase out from CIA made no managerial sense and that it was important to run the developmental and operational phases together as had been so successfully done in the past. He generally concurred in this philosophy but again came

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back to the fact that there was a military requirement for this system which could justify military development and also repeated the earlier view that CIA had not been enthusiastic for the program and therefore was a questionable organization to be responsible for its development. No decision was reached.

3. E-6/M-2 Program. McMillan discussed his conversations with Fubini on this subject, and Fubini had endorsed my point of view. McMillan himself had read the King Report carefully now and also concurred generally that the report was biased. He indicated that he was prepared to go along with Fubini's and my views, i. e., to authorize immediately the developmental work on the M-2 and on the E-6 but not to authorize flights of the E-6 until a much improved system was available. I indicated concurrence with this program. He is going to have one last check with Fubini and then proceed.

4. High Resolution Camera for the U-2. I raised the point of the unsatisfactory staff work relative to the CIA proposal to proceed with a M camera for the U-2. I pointed out that this project which was in answer to a specific request by the President's Board had been held up for more than a month due to some snap judgments by NRO staff. Now the project was being still further delayed as the result of his recent memorandum. I indicated that the points which he had raised in his memorandum had already been looked into and that either were being considered in the long-range program or had been ruled out as not practical. In the meantime we were still further delaying the ability to have an emergency capability in this area. He indicated he had not been aware that these other actions had been under way and asked that we prepare an over-all program which would put the camera 51 in context with other systems which might be used at a later date. I agreed to do this.

5. Reconnaissance Capability for Cuba. I pointed out that USIB had had a requirement since November to obtain [redacted] [redacted] To date there had essentially been no action nor any program out of the NRO although this requirement had been reiterated and I had on repeated occasions, both in writing and verbally, stressed the need to have a capability in this area. At the present time the only action which has been taken is the preparation of a staff study as of 1 April which listed the various [redacted] which were in being. At the present time there is no

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plan nor even any plan being prepared to develop a capability in this area. He agreed with this and indicated he would have somebody start on it right away.

6. R&D on Photo Processing. I raised the question about the unsatisfactory nature of his recent memorandum on the photographic processing R&D. I particularly took offense at the statements that CIA had acted in contradiction to written authority. I pointed out to him the documents on which we had operated and the history of the entire problem and asked that he recall his memorandum and correct it. He agreed to do this and did not offer any counter arguments to the points I made. I also pointed out that in the directed actions it made no sense to cancel the existing CIA contract and then immediately start another CIA contract, but that the proper way to handle it would be continue the CIA contract and in accordance with the directive change the technical management of this contract to Gen. Greer. I pointed out I disagreed with this decision on who should have technical responsibility but that, of course, this was his privilege as DNRO to make such a decision. I also pointed out that in contradiction with the statements in the memorandum CIA had, and was still procuring, film and supplies for the DOD. I expected to be reimbursed therefor. He indicated that this would be resolved and that CIA would be reimbursed for work already done as part of its R&D contract.

7. Agenda for the Purcell Panel. I briefly reviewed the Purcell Panel agenda with him and left him a copy. I pointed out the areas in which we were looking for briefings and assistance from Gen. Greer's people, and he agreed that these would be supplied.

Signed Herbert Scoville, Jr.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director
(Research)

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25X1A	At Friday's meeting McMillan stated		
25X1A	that [] had reported on a new		
25X1A	AR loading technique which had		
	reduced the cross section better than		
	[] had ever seen before. This		
	has been developed by []		
	It probably isn't as good as ours		
	since [] doesn't know the		
	details of our system, but it might be		
	worth looking into what he was referring.		
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